The issue of foreign aid dependency in African countries remains controversial among policy makers.So far, there is no consensus on aid effectiveness and the resulting policy prescriptions have been conflicting. The Euro zone which provides the bulk of foreign aid to developing countries, is currently implementing fiscal consolidation and some austerity programs. It is against this background that this study raises the question: What effects will such fiscal consolidation have on foreign aid flows? Therefore, the value of this study is the investigationofwhat really matters:The quantity or quality of foreign aid to support economic growth?We assess these issues within the framework of a country's legal origin. The quantity effects are proxied by the quadratic term on the aid variable. Source-based proxies are used to measure the quality of aid effects. Our findings suggest that both quality and quantity of aid matters and that these effects differ based on a country's legal origin.
I. Introduction
Overseas development assistance (ODA) or foreign aid, remain the largest source of external financing of the development of least developed countries (LDCs) . At the recent 2011 United Nations (UN) conference on LDCs, a renewed call was made for increased foreign aid flows to
LDCs [targeted at approximately 0.15% to 0.20% of gross national income for development assistance committee (DAC) members]. Yet, little conclusive empirical evidence exists in support of growth enhancing effects from foreign aid. For example, some studies have found neutral effects (Boone, 1996; Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004 and Easterly, 2007a , 2007b while others have found growth depressing effects (Bobba and Powell, 2007) . Other scholars have argued that aid can be growth enhancing under good macroeconomic policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Collier and Dollar, 2002) and favorable structural characteristics (Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp, 2004; Hansen and Tarp, 2001 ).Nevertheless, proponents have recommended increasing foreign aid flows, especially to countries in sub-Saharan Africa (UNDP, 2005; IMF and World Bank, 2005; European Commission, 2005; Sachs, 2005) , citing that the current quantity is not sufficient to provide the needed "big push" in order for these countries to leapfrog out of the poverty trap.
The issue of foreign aid dependency in African countries remains controversial among scholars, policy makers and international organizations. Asian economies that were at the same income level with some of the African economies in the 1950s have now emerged as the "newly industrialized" countries, with their economic growth largely driven by market fundamentals rather than foreign aid. The inability of African countries to wean themselves from foreign aid and duplicate the Asian miracle has puzzled many policy makers. Particularly, Africa has lagged other developing regions in attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) and competitively participating in international trade, the two major drivers of long term economic growth.
Critiques have been quick to blame both the donors (for crippling interference in Africa's development policies and in some cases, for not providing the right quantity and quality of aid) and the 'corrupt' government agenciesin some of the recipient countries (Calderisi, 2006; Moyo, 2009; Shah, 2012) ; with some scholars concluding that foreign aid is simply ineffective in the tropics (Dalgaard et al., 2004; Roodman, 2004) .
Nonetheless, African economies have made significant efforts to attract other forms of capital, but their efforts have been disappointing at best. For example, the pursuit of comprehensive macroeconomic policies under the IMF structural adjustment programs that were introduced in the 1980s, combined with an accelerated pace of liberalization, deregulation and privatization did not yield the anticipated surge in foreign direct investment activities, neither have these efforts diversified the export base in these countries (World Bank, 1997; IMF, 1999 ,UNCTAD, 2005 . Additionally, sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries have been particularly diligent in establishing export processing zones, signing investment treaties and generally providing a favorable investment climate more than any other developing countries outside of Asia, without attracting the expected FDI (Hallward-Driemeier, 2003) . And although the stock of FDI in the region has increased significantly since the 1980s, albeit at low levels compared to other developing regions, a large proportion of it is concentrated in oil and mineral rich countries (Basu and Srinivasan, 2002) . Mounting external debt (especially in the heavily indebted poor countries), weak economic institutions, poor governance and the heavy dependency on the primary sector are some of the persistent factors that have continued to cripple the region and keep it in the cycle of foreign aid dependency.
The most vulnerable of the developing countries and the most highly advocated (by the international community) for increased aid flow, are the LDCs. It is not surprising that 69% of these LDCs are in Africa and 83% of those Africa's LDCs are also classified as heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs). These countries have low savings rate, undiversified tax-base, and limited access to international capital markets and despite liberalizing their capital accounts, their domestic financial markets are weak and in some cases, missing. A combination of weak or underdeveloped financial markets and capital account liberalization can have dire consequences in terms of increasing a country's vulnerability to financial volatility, deterring long term FDI (Hermes and Lensink, 2003; UNCTAD, 1996b) and even attracting short term capital that has unfavorablegrowth effects (Lensink and Morrissey, 2002) . Furthermore, poor financial institutions can also affect a country's absorptive capacity of foreign aid, with real effects on economic growth (Berg, Hussain, Aiyar, Roache, Mirzoev and Mahone, 2006; Gupta, Powell and Yang, 2005) .
Accordingly, the goal of this paper is to assess the economic impact of the foreign aid on the recently observed positive economic growth in LDCs while controlling for policy, institutional, and key economic factors. In contrast to previous studies, we provide an analysis of the impact of aid in terms of its quantity and quality withinthe framework of Africa's least developed countries' legal origins. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008) and La Porta, Lopez-deSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998) argue that a country's legal origin can be a good predictor of the nature and efficiency of its institutions and policy formulation environment. The
French civil law, relative to the English common law tradition, for example, is associated with less efficient contract enforcement, heavy hand of government ownership and regulation and, possible higher corruption. French civil law embraces "socially-conditioned private contracting," in contrast to the English common law, which supports "unconditioned private contracting" (Pistor, 2006; Damaška,1986) . Unlike other developing countries, African countries maintain strong colonial ties (UNCTAD, 2005) . In many cases these countries have made little or no changes to their constitution since independence and such status quo is reflective of the quality and efficiency of their institutions and policy formulation environment. Thus, by evaluating aid effectiveness within the context of a country's legal origin, we are able to control for the impact of institutions (Dalgaard et al., 2004) and policies (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) without introducing proxies that have their own shortcomings (Dalgaard et al., 2004; Lensink and White, 2000) . Furthermore, all the countries in our sample are within the tropical climate.
This allows us to put to test the generalization in Dalgaard et al (2004) that foreign aid is ineffective in the tropics.
In the empirical analysis, we employ generalized method of moments(GMM) and fixed effects (FE) techniques to estimate growth regression model over the period of 1984-2010. The role of the quantity of aid is assessed by introducing a quadratic term on the total aid variable.
The quality of aid on the other hand, is measured using various source-based proxies. We use four specifications of bilateral aid, which captures the geostrategic aspect of foreign aid, and The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides a review of related literature, section III describes the methodology and the data, while Section IV presents the results of the empirical analysis followed by concluding remarks in Section V.
II. Related Literature Review
There are three strands of literature that explain the foreign aid -growth relationship in poor countries: the takeoff hypothesis, the conditionality requirement and the "timing and type of aid"
argument. The takeoff hypothesisstrand advocates for increased flow of foreign aid to poor countries (Sachs, 2005) . The underlying argument hinges on the fact that poor countries face a big financing gap. As a result, their physical capital accumulation has failed to keep up with the depreciation and the high population growth rates 2 . The financing gap is caused by among other factors; their low domestic savings, limited and undiversified tax base and poor access to traditional international capital markets. As a result, they lack sufficient capital stock required to lift them above the subsistence level onto a more accelerate and rapid development path. In other words, there exists a threshold level 3 of capital stock, beyond which capital begins to have meaningful growth enhancing effects. Therefore, a reasonable and sustained flow of foreign aid can help these countries meet and surpass that minimum capital stock, necessary for the takeoff into self sustained growth 4 (UNDP, 2005; IMF and World Bank, 2005) .
Nations Transitions authority (UNTA) ensures the implementation of the agreements of the comprehensive political settlement of countries in post conflict. It establishes a unique legitimate body and source of authority in which, throughout the transition period, independence and unit of a country are enshrined. The mandate given to UNTA includes aspects relating to human rights, the organization and conduct of free and fair general elections, military arrangements, civil administration, the maintenance of law and order, the repatriation and settlement of the refugees and displaced persons and the rehabilitation of essential structures in the country during the transition period.
2
See Weil, 1996, 2000 (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Lensik and White, 2001; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Clemens, Radelet, Bhavnani, 2004; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Moreira, 2005) or as an interaction with a policy variable (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) . The sign on the non-linear term has varied across studies. However, in line with the takeoff hypothesis, it is expected for the linear term to have a negative sign, while the quadratic term to have a positive sign.
Anecdotal evidence providessome hint as to why the quadratic term has not fared consistently in empirical analysis. For example, there are some poor countries in Africa that have received relatively large amount of aid for prolonged periods of time with no improvement in their economic growth and poverty reduction. Easterly (2006) , points out that a large proportion of these aid flows have been used in some cases, to finance growth-retarding government consumption rather than growth-enhancing public investment. Other examples point to the mismatch between donor objectives 5 and development needs of African countries (Calderisi, 2006; Shah, 2012) The second strand of literature (conditionality strand) holds that certain conditions in the aid recipient country must be in place before foreign aid effects on growth can be realized. The championing study in this line of argument is that of Burnside and Dollar (2000) . This study examines the relationship between foreign aid and economic growth within certain macroeconomic policies environment. They use a sample of fifty six developing countries, with the data averaged over 4-year periods, starting with 1970-73 to 1990-1993 . They concluded that aid tends to be more effective in developing countries with good fiscal, monetary and trade policies (as evidenced by the positive and significant coefficient on the interaction term between aid and their calculated policy index). Nonetheless, when they interact the non-linear specification of aid with the policy index, the resulting coefficient is insignificant (with a negative sign) -putting more emphasize on the policy rather than the surge in aid as predicted in the takeoff hypothesis.
5
Examples include donors using aid disbursements to financing poorly conceived 'white-elephant' projects; aid serving as a carrot for donor countries to gain access to poor countries goods markets while denying market access for poor countries products; and, in some cases, rich countries using aid to dump their highly subsidized agricultural products at the expense of the poor countries agricultural sector.
Despite the numerous criticisms of the Burnside and Dollar [see Lensink and White, 2000; Easterly 2003; Easterly, Levine and Roodman 2004] approach and their emphasis on the policy condition, other studies have also arrived at a similar conclusion (Collier and Dollar, 2002) .
Nevertheless, critics have provided competing evidence, suggesting, for example, that geographical factors, which account for "deep structural" characteristics, rather than policies, are keys in determining the effectiveness of foreign aid on growth (Dalgaard et al., 2004; Roodman, 2004) . Geographical factors, for example, may affect productivity, especially in the agricultural sector (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Sachs, 2001 and Masters and McMillan, 2001 ) and may also have influence on slow moving structural characteristics such as institutions Levine, 2003 and James, 2002) . Dalgaard et al. (2004) captures the conditional effects of aid on economic growth by interacting aid with the proportion of land in the tropics. Based on their empirical analysis, they provide a convincing conclusion that their findings (that aid is ineffective in the tropics) are superior to those based on policy interaction (Burnside and Dollar, 2000) and concavity effects (Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001 ). Roodman (2004) asserted that foreign aid works well outside of the tropic and not in the tropical countries.
However, Radelet, Clemens and Bhavnani, (2005) dismisses the validity of geographical factors as merely a separation of countries where aid has worked from those countries where it has failed, rather than an explanation of a causation of aid ineffectiveness.
The third strand of literature incorporates some of the elements from the aforementioned two strands with an additional twist. They account for the quality of aid and the timing of aid effects on growth (Clemens,Radelet, Bhavnani and Bazzi, 2011; Minoiu and Reddy, 2009; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Headey, 2007; Bobba and Powell, 2007; Clemens et al., 2004) . In reference to the quality of aid, these studies distinguish between multilateral aid 6 and bilateral aid and, further, separate development aid (non-geostrategic) from non-development aid (geostrategic 7 ).
They conclude that aid flows based on geostrategic factors have neutral effects on growth, while the non-geostrategic aid has growth enhancing effects (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bobba and Powell, 2007) .
Timing of the aid impact also matters in determining the aid-growth relationship (Clemens et. al, 2011) . For example, Clemens et al. (2004) find that aid allocated to sectors such as
6
It is generally assumed that multilateral aid tends to be development in nature.
7
Aid disbursed to political allies regardless of a country's policy and institutional environment. For example, Israel and Egypt have benefited from aid flows from United States due to regional strategic reasons.
agriculture, industry and public infrastructure investment tend to have immediate/short run impact on growth, relative to aid supporting democracy, environment, health and education, which usually has postponed/late impact on growth. Overall, development aid (aid allocated towards investment spending),will tend to have immediate/direct impact on the economy and support long run economic growth, while non-development aid (aid responding to disasters or social issues) will tend to have indirect impact on economic growth. Therefore, effects stemming from development aid are more likely to be captured in the short run data relative to those coming from non-development aid (Clemens et al, 2011 ).
An area that has received little attention in the aid-growth literature is how aid effects are transmitted to growth. Gomanee, Girma and Morrissey (2002) attempted to address the transmission question. Using a sample of 25 sub-Saharan African countries over the period of 1970-1997, they find that aid effects are transmitted to growth via investment spending. They dismiss government consumption spending (established in White, 1998 ; and more recently, in White and Dijkstra, 2003) as a possible transmission mechanism. They also find that while aid has some effects on imports, imports do not matter in growth. Boone (1996) also provided evidence supporting the positive relationship between aid and investment.
Generally, empirical studies have yielded divergent evidence on aid-growth linkage 8 .These divergent results, according to Clemens et.al (2011) , are due to; (i) lack of controlling of the timing of aid effects on growth and, (ii) using invalid and/or weak instrumental variables.
Particularly, results in the leading studies [Boone, 1996; Burnside and Dollar, 2000; Rajan and Subramanian, 2008] in the aid-growth literature rests their strength of accounting for aid endogeneity primarily on population growth. To resolve this divergence, Clemens et al (2011) incorporates three changes in the three leading studies. First, they allow aid to affect growth with a time lag. Second, they first-difference the data to remove the effects of time invariant omitted variables. Third, they disaggregateaid data into "early impact" and late impact" components. By incorporate these changes they arrive at a harmonized conclusion that aid has modest growthenhancing effects.
8
For example, there is substantial evidence of neutral effects of aid on growth (Easterly, 2007a (Easterly, , 2007b (Easterly, , 2005 Easterly, Levine and Roodman, 2004; Boone, 1996) . Others have found depressing effects (Bobba and Powell, 2007 ). Yet, some have found positive relationship between aid and growth (Clemens, et al, 2004; Lensink and Morrissey, 2000) .
III. Methodology and Data
The empirical model investigates the impact of foreign aid on economic growth while controlling for various growth determinants. The primary objectives are to assess; 1) whether quantity or quality of foreign aid matters to the economic growth of recipient countries 9 , and, 2) whether these effects differ based on a country's legal origin. Two models are estimated. In the first model we enter the aid variables as standalone and in the second model, these variables are interacted with a dummy variable of the country's legal origin.Specifically, two dummy variables are used; a dummy variable for French legal origin (dFrench) takes a value of one for former French colonies and zero otherwise. The British dummy variable (dBritish) equally takes a value of one for former British colonies and zero otherwise. The baseline model is as outlined in equation (1):
Δy it is the average annual growth rate of output per capita in country i between the yearst and t-τ, where τ takes the value of 3. In line with the growth literature, we average the growth rate across 3-year non-overlapping periods. All independent variables are initial values at the beginning of each 3-year period with the exception of the terms of trade growth (Totgr), which is averaged over the 3-year period.
The major right-hand side variable of interest is Foreign aid (ODA). The ODA variable takes various forms to measure the quantity and quality aspects of foreign aid. The quantity aspect is proxied by thequadratic term on the net official development assistance received (as a percentage of GDP) variable (ODA 2 ). Due to lack of more appropriate measures of quality of foreign aid, we use source-based proxies.
9
Shah (2012)argues that donor countries have not lived up to their promises on both quantity and quality of aid.
The first proxy isbilateral aid. In addition to total bilateral aid, we include aid from France and United Kingdom, given that countries in our sample are associated with either French (61%)
or British (31%) legal origins. Bilateral aid fromthe European Union (EU) is also included on the basis that collectively, EU member countries are the biggest foreign aid donors to African countries. We assume that a large proportion of bilateral aid is geostrategic in nature. UK and France in particular tend to direct most of its bilateral aid to its former colonies, with nondemocratic colonies receiving almost two times more aid than democratic non-colonies (Minoiuand Reddy, 2009) . We expect such geostrategic aid, which is dispersed regardless of the country's policy environment and political institutions, to have undesirable impact on economic growth relative to non-geostrategic aid.
The second proxy is aid from multilateral agencies: UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNTA, UNHCR, UNTA and WFP. We assume that the effects of multilateral aid from UN agencies depend on the goals and objectives of that agency. For example, the goal of United Nations Development Programs (UNDP) is to help countries achieve their development objectives.
UNDP works with individual countries in areas including; poverty reduction, democratic governance, crisis prevention and recovery, environment and energy and HIV/Aids. Therefore, we expect aid from UNDP to have favorable impact on growth relative to aid from United Nations High Commission for Refugee (UNHCR), which respond to growth-retarding crisis.
The growth impact of aid from World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), United Nations Transition Authority (UNTA) and United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA) are undetermined prior to conducting empirical analysis. WFP, UNICEF and UNFPA provide aid that support social programs. Most social programs such as those related to health and education are imperfectly correlated with income and may often have unnoticeable short run impact on growth. Nevertheless, countries that have laid a good foundation of human capital (for example, the East Asian countries, China and Vietnam) have managed to shift to high growth performance relative to those that adopted the growth-centric approach while neglecting social development (Ranis, Stewart, Ramirez, 2000; White, 1999b) .
The growth literature (Barro, 1991; Levine and Renelt, 1992; Sala-i-Martin, Doppelhofer, Miller, 2004) guides us in selecting the core set of growth determinants; however the estimated model variables are constrained by the available data. The initial level of output per capita
is included to test for the presence of β-convergence. The argument that good policies are a precondition for aid effectiveness has been widely debated since Burnside and Dollar (2000) .
While the disagreements are obvious, there is hardly any contention on the importance of good macroeconomic policies for economic growth. Therefore, we include three policy variables:
trade, fiscal and monetary policies. Because of the inconclusive results in literature on the interaction between aid and policy 10 measures, we do not include that interaction term in this study.
Starting in the early 1980s, developing countries experienced a wave of macroeconomic policy shifts away from import protection, managed exchange rates, and targeted subsidies towards trade, investment and financial market liberalization. The objectives of the policy shift were believed, among other factors, to positively affect a country's economic growth by increasing the competitiveness and efficiency of the export sector and overall improving the production efficiency in the domestic market. Consequently, we expect trade openness (Open), measured as the percentage of merchandise trade 11 (imports + exports) in GDP, to positively enhance economic growth.
Monetary policy (Infl) is proxied by the CPI inflation rate (Fischer, 1993) , specified as the logarithm of (1+ inflation rate). Fiscal policy on the other hand is proxied by the government consumption spending (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993; Barro, 1991) . As a fiscal policy instrument, government consumption expenditure (Fisc) can be used during economic downturns to stimulate aggregate demand and output through the Keynesian effect. However, if the spending is politically motivated or is a result of corruption, it could have negative consequences on the medium and long run economic growth.
Good governance, political stability and well developed financial markets all provide conducive environment for economic growth (Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi, 2004; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2005) . Particularly, proponents of the free market system argue that in countries where the role of the government is limited, for example, to providing public goods such as infrastructure and public security, maintaining the rule of law, and enforcing contracts, not only reduces social discontent but also ensures a healthy private sector
10
Several studies have tested the interaction between aid and the Burnside and Dollar (2000) policy index and they found the interaction to be insignificant (see Easterly et.al, 2003; Dalgaard and Hansen, 2001; Tarp, 2001 and White, 2001 ). competition, which promotes productivity and growth. Furthermore, a country with good governance is also more likely to promote growth enhancing policies.
Polity2 index from the Polity IV Project (2011) is used as a proxy for governance. The index is measured on a scale of -10 to +10; with -10 indicating strongly autocratic (political suppression) and +10 a strongly democratic (political freedom) political system. Barro (1994) assessed the effects of democracy on growth using a sample of 100 countries from 1960 to 1990 and found that after controlling for all other core determinants of growth democracy had a weak negative effect on growth.
The proportion of money supply (M2) in GDP is used as a proxy for the depth of the financial market development (FD). King and Levine (1993) The need to control for the rate of population growth in aid-growth regressions was highlighted in Easterly (2006) . Increased population growth can penalize economic growth in a number of ways. It can divert resources away from production goods to reproduction related consumption (Becker and Barro, 1988) . It can also penalize the steady state level of output per worker in the neoclassical growth model. Specifically, if the population is growing faster than the level of economic growth, then a portion of the economy's investment is allocated towards providing capital for new workers, rather than increasing capital per worker (Barro, 1994) . These effects can have undesirable implications on aid effectiveness. On the other hand, declining population growth rates can be an indication of the development of social institutions such as healthcare and education (which expands with economic growth) (Schultz, 1989; Behrman, 1990 and Lee, 1994) .
Population growth is also often used as a proxy for the rate of growth of labor input in the production process. In studies on African economies, population growth, especially in urban areas, has been found to be a strong determinant of infrastructure development and other key 12 They caution that money supply (M2 or M3) as a share of GDP does not capture the quality of the financial market development. However, the bias that may arise from the quality effects is not central to this study.
institutions such as the financial sector (Allen, Carletti, Cull, Qian, Senbet, and Valenzuela, 2012) . For these reasons, the sign of the population growth rate (Popg) coefficient is unpredicted prior to our empirical investigation. Furthermore, we include a measure of investment (Inv), which captures the effects of domestic investment activities on growth. Terms of trade growth (Totgr) controls for external shocks, while measures of oil and ores resources (Res) take into account the resources endowment in some of the LDCs.
We also address a number of methodological issues. The averaged dependent variable controls for the effects of short-run cyclical fluctuations and minimizes the impact of outliers.
Endogeneity bias may arise due to the potential endogeneity of growth determinants, such as foreign aid, openness, government consumption spending, and investment. On the other hand, there is a possibility that low growth may cause increased foreign aid flows and vis-a-vis, or, that both foreign aid and growth maybe jointly determined by a third variable. In such instances, the model will suffer from reverse causality and simultaneity bias. By using initial level of foreign aid, we are able to control for the reverse causality bias. Other biases that may affect the consistency of the estimates include the heterogeneity (omitted variable) bias and the measurement error (in independent variables).
We report results based on two estimation techniques. The system GMM (SGMM) approach of Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) (Roodman, 2006) .
3.1.Data
The regressionanalysis is conducted using a sample of 26 SSA LDCs (including 25 The countries in the samplewith the corresponding legal origin are listed in Table 1A . 
IV. RESULTS
Results based on the baseline specification defined in equation (1) 
Does quantity of foreign aid matter to economic growth?
The takeoff hypothesis literature advocates for increased flow of foreign aid to poor countries (Sachs, 2005) . A reasonable and sustained flow of foreign aid is necessary to help poor countries meet and surpass the threshold capital stock, which is needed for the takeoff into the self sustained growth (UNDP, 2005; IMF and World Bank, 2005) . To test this hypothesis, we include both linear and quadratic specifications of the total aid (ODA) variablein the regression model (Table 2A , column 1). As expected, the linear specification has a negative sign, while that on the quadratic specification is positive. However, only the quadratic specification is significant, albeit at 10% level.
To assess whether the quantity effects of aid differ based on a country's legal origin, we interact both the linear and quadratic specifications of aid with dummy variables for French and British legal origins. Results are summarized in Tables 2B, column 
Does the quality of foreign aid matter to economic growth?
The next argument is whether or not the quality of aid matters to economic growth. Previous studies that attempted to address the quality of aid impact on growth concluded that aid flows based on geostrategic factors have neutral effects on growth, while non-geostrategic aid has growth enhancing effects (Rajan and Subramanian, 2008; Bobba and Powell, 2007) . In this study, we employ two categories of proxies for quality of aid; bilateral aid and multilateral aid.
Generally we expect bilateral aid to be geostrategically driven and hence, have negative effects on growth. On the other hand, we assume that the impact of multilateral aidon growthdepends on the goals of the agencies providing the aid. In Table 2A , columns 2-4 we report the results of total bilateral aid, bilateral aid from France, UK and EU, respectively. In all specifications, we observenon-robust negative effects, with the exception of bilateral aid from France, which is robust at 10% level. When total bilateral aid and EU aid variables are interacted with the dummies for French and British legal origins (Table 2B , columns 2-3), both the French-aid interaction terms have negative signs. Nevertheless, the growth retarding effects are statistically significant only in the case of total bilateral aid. In the case of British-aid interactions, robust effects are present only with theEU aid. In other words, increasing initial total bilateral aid by 1% hurts economic growth of former French colonies by 0.02% for the next three years, with neutral effects in former British colonies. But, when initial bilateral aid from EU member countries is increased by the same 1%, it is the former British colonies that benefit, with a 0.7% boost in growth of their real GDP per capita for the subsequent three years.
In Table 2A (Table 2B , column 5), we observe the following; 1) in the former French colonies, theonly aid with robust, albeit growth retarding effects, is from UNTA agency. 2) Aid from four of the six UN agencies included in this study has statistically significant effects in the LDCs with British legal origin. Specifically, an increase in the share of aid from UNDP and UNICEF boosts economic growth of former British colonies, while that from UNHCR and UNTA retards their growth. Clemens et al. (2004) found that aid allocated to sectors such as agriculture, industry and public infrastructure investment tend to have immediate impact on growth, relative to aid supporting democracy, environment, health and education, which usually has postponed/late impact on growth.Overall, the economic effects of multilateral aid are largely robust in the former British colonies relative to the French colonies.
The estimated coefficients of the control variables in Table 2 , where significant, are consistent with the findings in the empirical growth literature (Levine and Renelt, 1992; Barro, 1998; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004) . In all specification, we observe the presence of beta convergence within the sample as signified by the negative sign of the coefficient of the initial per capita GDP. Initial investment, financial development, governance (proxied by the Polity2 variable), fiscal policy (government consumption spending), shares of fuels and ores in merchandise exports, terms of trade growth, and, population growth are found to stimulate growth over the 3-year period where significant.
The robust positive effect of initial institutional quality on growth is in line with existing work on the role of institutions in developing countries (Green, 2011; Sachs and Warner, 1997) .
Notwithstanding, the positive sign on the inflation measure and government consumption spending contradicts the negative link found in cross-country growth regressions (e.g., Barro, 1996; Sala-i-Martin et al., 2004; Gomanee et al., 2005) , although some studies have found favorable effects in the case of government consumption spending (Yasin, 2003) .
FE Estimation Results
We also provide results based on FE estimations (Tables 3A and 3B ). In most specifications, the findings are consistent with those established under SGMM estimations in Table 2 . In Table   3A (column 1), the total aid variables have the expected signs. However, only the quadratic term is significant. When we introduce the interaction terms (Table 3B) , the quadratic specification maintain its positive sign, with robust effects observed in both former French and British colonies. The linear specification on the other hand, is now robust with positive effects but, only in the former French colonies.
With reference to the quality of aid measures, total bilateral aid and bilateral aid from UK have significant and positive effects, while aid flows from France and EU member countries have neutral effects (Table 3A , columns 2-4). Introducing the French and British dummy interactions with total and EU bilateral aid measures yields significant effects only in the case of EU aid. These effects are positive in the former British colonies, but, negative in the former French colonies (Table 3B , columns 3). In the case of multilateral aid, aid from UNDP, UNHCR and WFP also maintain their significant effects as previously established under SGMM, with UNDP and WFP having favorable effects on economic growth while UNHCR having unfavorable effects (Table 3A , column 5). The results for the interaction terms in Table 3B (column 4), where significant, also mirror those of SGMM in terms of direction of effects.
Specifically, UNDP and UNHCR aid has positive and negative effects respectively, in the former Studies on the transmission mechanism of foreign aid effects on growth have pointed to investment and government consumption spending as the possible channels. As previously noted, most of these studies have emphasized on investment spending. White (2007) asserted that empirical models, which include both aid and investment on the right hand side, risk ruling out the major channel through which aid might affect growth and therefore, underestimate the aid effects. To test this assertion, we excluded investment and government consumption spending from the regression models using stepwise regression. Nevertheless, excluding these two variables did not significantly alter the effects of aid on growth relative to those previously established in models including the two variables. We summarize some of the results in table 4 13 .
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of foreign aid effectiveness in developing countries has continued to puzzle many policy makers and donors alike, especially, the inability of African economies to duplicate the Asian growth miracle, and, wean themselves from foreign aid dependency. Critiques have been quick to point fingers at both the donors and governments of recipient countries for self-serving motives at the expense of the needy.Yetproponents continue to advocate for increased aid flows to poor nations. As previously noted, many empirical studies have attempted to establish the
13
Additional results are available upon request.
mixed and the resulting policy recommendations are conflicting.
In this study, we argue that both quantity and quality of aid matters to economic growth of Africa's LDCs. In addition, we show that these effects differ based on a country's legal origin.
Due to lack of appropriate data, we use source based variables as proxy for quality of aid. The quantity of aid is proxied by introducing a quadratic specification in the estimation model. Our 
